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The Literature of Administrative

Law and the New Davis Treatise
Frank C. Newman*
Assume that Clifford Witter, dancing teacher, waltzes out of the
Arthur Murray Studios into employment by the Fred Astaire
Studios. Assume too that Arthur Murray, wisely anticipant, has had
a string tied to Witter in the form of a contract proscribing such
competition. Should a court of equity "pull that string and yank
Witter out of Fred Astarie's pedagogical pavilion"? Judge Earl
Hoover of Ohio, facing that issue some years ago, pronounced
"No"-and then told us why in an unusually lengtbly trial opinion?
The opinion has always intrigued me because of the judge's introductory paragraph. He says:
This is not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot
find enough to quench his thirst. To the contrary there is so much authority it drowns him. It is a sea-vast and vacillating, overlapping and
bewildering. One can fish out of it any kind of strange support for anything, if he lives so long. This deep and unsettled sea pertaining to an
employee's covenant not to compete with his employer after termination
of employment is really Seven Seas; and now that the court has sailed
them, perhaps it should record those seas so that the next weary traveler
may be saved the terrifying time it takes just to find it.2

The Seven Seas are (1) the "periodical sea," (2) the "sea of annotations," (3) the "sea of encyclopedias," (4) the "sea of treatises," (5)
the "restatement sea," (6) the "digest sea," and (7) "Ohio's own
Sea." The massive citations that Judge Hoover records are most
impressive, and the next traveler no doubt is pleased when he finds
them. I wonder, though: Having found them is he much less terrified? (My students in Equity each year, unhappily forced to read
the opinion, tend to become perplexed and overwhelmed.)
Then I wonder more: If that kind of minute problem in equity,
or contracts, or torts frightens us, because analyses and descriptions
of it have become so massive, how ever can we confidently face
the full range of problems in administrative law? For if employees'
covenants not to compete float on seven seas, how much more do
*Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley
1. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
2. Id. at 687.
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administrative law problems orbit in Outer Space, thus perhaps
in Infinity?
The literature of administrative law is monstrous, cavernous,
gargoyloid, unconfined and vagrant. It comprehends most official
adjudicating, most law making, most governing in general.8 Its raw
materials (including mountains of documentary material) bulk
larger than those of any other 'law subject." It includes practice and
theory, report and speculation, diatribe and reform.
Now, in Professor Davis's magnificent, four-volume Administrative Law Treatise, the subject is packaged more informatively than
ever before. To his energy and scholarship my first aim here is to
pay tribute. Practitioners, teachers, and others should indeed be
grateful for his creative contribution to the vast topic.
Yet this must be stressed: In most situations that call for skill and
wisdom in administrative law tasks, no lawyer, scholar, teacher,
or reformer, no legislator, administrator, or judge, from the Treatise
alone, will fit himself adequately for his assignment. The book contains by far our most practically useful survey of the materials of
administrative law; nonetheless it stands incomplete. To illustrate:
(1) Though highly valuable chapters deal with topics such as
adjudication procedure, examiners, institutional decisions, evidence,
and official notice, this is not a book that tells lawyers how to practice before agencies. Further, most of the manuals and other writings
that have been specifically designed to aid that practice are not
even cited.4
3. Professor Davis states that "The quantity of adjudication by agencies probably
exceeds the quantity of adjudication by courts, and the annual output of administrative rules is probably larger than the annual output of statutes." Preface to
DAvIs, AD m-STRATIvE LAW TREATISE at iii (1958). (Emphasis added.) I would
have substituted the word "obviously" for the word "probably."
4. See, eig., Cooper, Suggestions for the Trial of Cases Before Administrative.
Agencies, Prac. Law., Feb. 1956, p. 61; Fowler, The Role of the Private Practitioner
in Federal Regulation, 6 S.C.L.Q. 326 (1954); cf. Miller, The Advocate Before Administrative Agencies, 1956 U. IL. L.F. 189. But cf. DAvis, ADMINISTnATiVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 4.11 n.7, 8.13 nn.2 & 8 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis]. See also the
countless articles such as Plaine, Atomic Energy- A New Body of Administrative
Law, 24 D.C.B.J. 71 (1957); Plaine, The Rules of Practice of the A.E.C., 34 TEXAS
L. REv. 801 (1956); the symposia on the SEC (1956) and on various government
contract matters (seriatim) in the Federal Bar Journal; and items like these In the
PracticalLawyer: Dillon, The Preparationand Trial of an Industrial Security Case,,
Oct. 1956, p. 68; French & Poland, FPC Practice, Oct. 1956, p. 77; Meekor, SEC
Legal Assistance Available to the General Practitioner,Oct. 1957, p. 42; Woyand
& Zarky, Informal Procedure Before the NLRB, Jan. 1955, p. 31; Cf. GooncI &
REDMAN, PRocEDunE BEF o E THE INTERNA REvENuE SERVICE passim (1957); Hl ggins & Woelflen, Bringing Suit in California Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, in
CALIFoRNIA Crvi
PRAcTcE BiEFoRE TRIAL 899 (1957).
It is unfortunate, I think, that Davis decided not to include names of particular
agencies in his index. Compare the following section headings:
SEC Supervision of Registration and Acceleration.
FTC Supervision through Stipulations and Consent Orders.
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(2) Though this book contains more "state administrative law"
than ever before has been collated, the total by no means serves
even as a beginning for a "restatement" of that law; reasonably
thorough coverage has been attempted only for selected topics;'
and most of the leading guides to administrative law in particular

states are not cited.'
(8) Though the Davis handling of United States Supreme Court

and Courts of Appeals cases is the most comprehensive we have yet
witnessed, district court and federal agency reports are minimized.

Readers who wish to learn of new developments or follow-up developments at the trial level will still have to do their own library
work. When I checked volume 6 of the 1957 Pike and Fisher Administrative Law 2d, for instance, I found a total of seventy-two district

court level cases plus 119 cases from the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, the CAB, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, NLRB, SEC,
OAP, AEC, FMB, CSC, the Coal Mine Safety Board of Review, and

the Board of Immigration Appeals. Of these, only thirteen of the
district court and only three agency cases could be found in the

"Table of Cases" of the Treatise.
(4) Though on occasion Professor Davis perceptively treats theFCC Supervision of Radio and TV Programs.
Amendment of NLB Charges.
The Taft-Hartley Act on Consultation.
Communications Act Amendments, 1952 [on Consultation].
The Immigration Act of 1952 [on Consultation].
The Immigration Act of 1952 [on Consultation].
Some Examples [of Official Notice] from ICC Practice.
Aliens [and the Right to be Heard].
Passports [and the Right to be Heard].
See also §§ 19.02-.06, dealing with primary jurisdiction law and ICC, NLRB, antitrust, and Railway Labor Act cases. Forms relating to CAB, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC,
NLRB, and federal judicial review proceedings appear at 4 DAvis 271-395. Cf. 2
DAvis § 14.07.
5. Chapter 24 is entitled "State Forms of Proceeding for Review." Other discussions of state law are identified by section headings in chs. 2, 6-7, 9, 11, 14-15,
17, 19-21, and 28 [section and chapter references are to DAvis, op. cit. supra note 3
when not otherwise indicated]. The headings show that the coverage is sometimes
as broad as the chapter's discussion of federal law, e.g., "State Court Decisions on
Subdelegation," ch. 9; sometimes much narrower, e.g., § 11.04.
6. See, e.g., Anderson, A Comparative Analysis of the Federal and Ohio Admln-1
istrative Procedure Acts, 24 U. Cnw. L. REv. 365 (1955); Burton, Administrative
Procedure Before Certain Agencies of the State, 17 AL.A. LAw. 125 (1956); Fuquay,
Rule Making and Adjudication in Florida Administrative Law, 9 U. F.A. L. REv. 260
(1956); Peck, Amendments Cause Veto of Model State Administrative ProcedureAct
Legislation, 32 WAsH. L. REv. 181 (1957); Sheppard, Texas AdministrativeProcedures
for the PracticingAttorney, 8 BAmR L. REV. 385 (1956); Symposium Issue [Missouri Administrative Law], 19 K~A. Crry L. REv. _27 (1951); Symposium Issue
[Oklahoma Administrative Law], 7 Or.A. L. REv. 133 (1954); Symposium on Administrative Law and Procedure in Colorado, 29 DicTA 431 (1952); cf. Jennings,
The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw &
CoN,rrna,. PRoB. 193 (1958); Symposium on Washington Administrative Law, 33
WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1958). See also 1 DAvis, § 1.04 nn.33-34.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 483:637

ories of governmental organization and like concerns of political
science, the book contains no reference to the works of Dwight
Waldo, David Truman, Herbert Simon, Harold Lasswell, Leonard
White, John Gaus, John Millet, Glendon Schubert, Fritz Morstein
Marx, Earl Latham, and many other scholars whose concerns that
overlap his concerns are surely identifiable.
Do those kinds of omission indicate that the book is faulty? Or
that Professor Davis did not do all his homework? Or that a demand
for supplemental writings will soon inspire a more complete, competitive treatise? Obviously not. The book as it stands is wonderfully
comprehensive. The finding and collecting chores that Professor
Davis has discharged are staggering. His catalogs of the unsolved
problems are nonpareil. His contributions to the solving of those
problems are countless, conscientious, often brilliant. And at the
end of this review I shall propose some future writing I believe
would be much more useful than competitive tomes which are still
unwritten. With respect particularly to uncited cases, would a
better treatise carry a guarantee that all published opinions have
been checked for enlightenment? No, for even if there were enough
years to write such a book, analysis and critique in it would inevitably be sacrificed. Today the "sea of cases" defies complete exploration, and we should concede our impotence to chart it.
I. THE NE w DAviS
Thousands of readers know Professor Davis's 1951 text and his
varied periodical writings. Among those readers many may wonder
how now to approach the 2500 page Treatise. I hardly suggest it for
after-dinner reading, though his style remains crisp, colorful, provocative. For whoever wish a complete survey (to see if their own
ideas, say, have kept pace), I recommend:
(1) a splitting of the whole into these divisions: Introduction; 8 Procedure; 9 and Judicial Review;9 and
(2) within each division, a careful study of the list of section headings that introduces each chapter, and then a reading of the last
section of each chapter.
The last sections vary in aim but together, I think, fairly portray the
author and his work. Kenneth Culp Davis has a reputation not
7. Cf. Davis & Harris, "Reflections of a Law Professor on Instruction and Research
in Public Administration": An Exchange, 48 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 174 (1954). See also
Fesler, Administrative Literature and the Second Hoover Commission Reports, 51
Am. POL. Sca RE v. 135 (1957); Schubert, Political Science Research and Instruction
in Administrative Law, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 294 (1958). Should the Treatise at least have
mentioned PARMNSON's LAw (1957)?
8. 1 DAvis chs. 1-2.
9. Id. cbs. 3-18.
10. Id. chs. 19-40.
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based on scholarship alone. I do not know whether the 1942 fight
with Roscoe Pound was his first famous controversy," but he has
been a noted participant in many administrative law battles. There
may be readers who, because of those battles and because of reservations they had as to his arguments, his citations, his vigor, or his
etiquette, have built in their minds an image of probable Davis
views-just as we anticipate how Time, The Wall Street Journal,
or The Nation will respond to public events. Let me say this: Those
readers will be disappointed who in this treatise expect to detect
biases assumed by such phrases as pro-government, pro-New Deal,
anti-business, anti-American Bar, pro- or anti-Supreme Court, civil
libertarian or Ivory Tower. Professor Davis's hard-headed, driving
philosophy is uniquely his own; and I do not attempt to paraphrase
it here. That it is a flexible philosophy, tailored to data that become
available to him, is shown in part by several contrasts between the
Treatise and the 1951 text.
To illustrate: In the 1951 text "The Rule of Necessity" (requiring
a biased adjudicator nonetheless to hear a case) was treated as a
patently needed rule." In the Treatise we are reminded, with persuasive discussion, that "The easy and seemingly automatic application of the rule of necessity is more dangerous than is recognized in
.typical judicial opinions, for grave injustice may result from alloving disqualified officers to adjudicate cases.""' Similarly, in the text
his defense of intra-agency consultation makes no mention of dangers relating to the use of extra-record facts.'" The Treatise, on the
distinguish between extraother hand, states that "we must carefully
5
record ideas and extra-record facts." '
One change in the Davis philosophy that I regret is mirrored in
the preface of the Treatise. Davis states: "Although administrative
law comes from many sources, the principal law maker is and will
continue to be the Supreme Court of the United States." 01 Further,
"Administrative law is the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including especia~ly the law governing judicial review of administrative action." " One can readily
approve his focus on "powers and procedures" (notwithstanding the
resulting omission of what Mr. Westwood labels "substantive ad11. Davis, Dean Pound and Administrative Law, 42 COLUm. L. REv. 89 (1942);
Davis, Dean Pound's Errors About Administrative Agencies, 42 CoLu.%L L. R1,. 804
(1942).
12. DA vis, AD. mqsnriAvn LAw § 115 (1951).
13. 2 DAvis § 12.04, at 164.
14. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 12, at ch. 8.
15. 2 DAvis § 11.11, at 91.
16. Preface to DAvIs at iv.
17. This is the first sentence of the body of the Treatise. 1 DAvis oh. 1, at 1.
(Emphasis added.)
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ministrative law"1"), but the new stress on review and on the
Supreme Court's rarified handling of review seems to me unfortunate. If we must identify "the principal law maker," then it is the
Congress of the United States, which in scores of statutes (of which
the Administrative Procedure Act " is merely the broadest) prescribes for administrators the details of power and procedure that
govern most matters. In his text, Professor Davis more moderately
claimed that "the great bulk [of administrative law] . . .is created
by courts."2" Even that, I submit, was misleading. The great bulk
of administrative law is created not by courts but by administrators,
via rules and adjudicative orders and opinions that relate to power
and procedure.
Agency rule makers and adjudicators do pay considerable attention to statutes, but if Professor Davis believes they are regularly
influenced by Supreme Court opinions I believe he is mistaken. My
contention could be documented, I think, with statistics on how
infrequently, in practice, crucial reference has been made by administrators to Pike & Fisher, say, or to pages 595-956 of the Fifth
Decennial Digest, or to the pocket-part Administrative Law sum-

maries in the Supreme Court Digest, or to Davis on Administrative
Law.
That default does not, of course, characterize the government
and private lawyers who have written briefs aimed at persuading
judges. But the contribution of those lawyers and judges, however
crucial, has never been "principal" or "bulkiest." The statute writers,
the rule-writers, and the agency-opinion-writers are the law men
who merit those two adjectives; and though most of those writers
are familiar perhaps with such cases as the four Morgans2 and the
two Chenerys,2" I speculate that their activities in general are little
affected by Supreme Court holdings.
True, the Court's holdings do have great impact on judicial review, where the initial questions relate to court powers and procedures not agency powers and procedures.-" But why again dres a
18. 43 MimN. L. REV. at 607-10.
19. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952).
20. Davis, op. cit. supra note 12, at 2; see 1 DAVIS § 1.01, at 4.
21. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941); United States v. Morgan,
307 U.S. 183 (1939); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Morgan v. United
States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
22. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v, Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80 (1943).
23. It is interesting to note that in the widely distributed preface, where Davis
strongly criticizes the 1938-1958 Supreme Court, every case he cites but one relates
to court powers more than to agency powers. The one case, Fahey v. Malonee, 332
U.S. 245 (1947), involves the allegedly understandable confusion of a trial judge
regarding standards required for delegations of legislative power. My feeling is that
if that judge really was misled by Court pronouncements, either the case before
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noted author force us to remind his readers that people, as distinguished from judges, are normally not affected much by those initial

questions? People are most affected by what administrators do,
not what judges do. We may not know yet how most usefully to
discuss it, but I deny that "the great bulk of administrative law
that is worth discussing is, from a realistic standpoint, judge made
law."

24

II. Tim TBEATISE AND "rH LAW"
That Professor Davis originally approached The Law with humility is shown in the 1951 text:
Possibly no other major field of law has been for so long so much in
need of systematic statement of principles. That need continues. This
book cannot purport to satisfy it. The field is still so unruly that one is
sufficiently ambitious who attempts to dig out and to organize the problems, to present such law as is susceptible of summary, to discuss pros and
cons, and to contribute here and there to solutions. The search for sound
principle has frequently failed. Even when that search has seemed to meet
some measure of success, the suggested answers are usually presented
with diffidence and doubt.2 5

That continued work has kept him humble is shown by parallel
excerpts from the Treatise:
The huge mass of administrative law that has sprung up in recent
decades is seriously in need of systematic statement of principles. This
treatise may partially satisfy the need, but not more than partially. Even
though each chapter attempts to collect, classify, and summarize the law,
many chapters achieve something less than a systematic statement of
principles ...
Even though we have had a federal administrative process since 1789,
current problems in modem contexts are characteristically largely new
and largely fluid. Whether the thinking stems from judges or from administrators, legislators, pressure groups, study groups, or scholarly commentators, it usually has many or most of the earmarks of the early stages
of thinking about any problem. When this is so, a treatise is mostly
him was badly briefed or he did not conscientiously consider the governing
precedents.
The following excerpt from a letter written to me by Professor Davis in September

may be of interest:
[One point] on which we differ is whether the Supreme Court is the principal
law maker in the field. If it isnt, then the whole treatise is unsound, as are all

the casebooks, without exception, and nearly all the literature, including even
articles by . .. Frank Newman. All the courses that I know about regard the
Supreme Court as the principal law maker. I know, at one time I shared in the
then prevalent reaction that we had- to get more to the administrative process
itself and away from the courts' version of it, but as time has gone on I've realized
more and more that what the practitioner needs is guidance about the framework

developed by courts. If administrative law is the law about powers and procedures, as I deem it to be, it is mostly judge-made.
24. 1 DAvis § 1.01, at 5 n.8. (Emphasis added.)
25. Preface to DAvis, op. cit. supra note 12, at iii.
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restricted to digging out and organizing the problems, presenting such
law as is susceptible of summary, discussing pros and cons, and attempting to make contributions to the solution of the problems of law making.
A systematic statement of principles often must await a good deal more
interaction of imagination and experience, a longer period of case-to-case
development, more evolution through trial-and-error methods. Satisfactory principles to govern intricate problems can seldom be struck off fullblown; they have to grow over a period of time .... 20

My own belief is that the "period of time" will be hopelessly long if
we must await case-to-case development and the kind of "evolution
through trial-and-error methods" to which we have become accustomed. Even if the Supreme Court Justices were to adopt Professor
Davis's five suggestions for their self-improvement, "7 I would not
agree that administrative law could best be developed, over-all,
by "a focus upon particular problems as they arise in particular
contexts, with the full benefit of the adversary system- briefs and
arguments of counsel directed to crystallized, narrow issues."2s
What he underemphasizes, in my opinion, is the essential role of
statutes in administrative law reform. There are good reasons for
concluding that the bulk of judicial review law can best be reformed
by judges. But law relating to agency powers and procedures is
quite different, for judges inevitably can deal only with tiny pieces
of it. If bureaucrats universally, or even typically, were men of the
needed training, experience, vision, and good will, perhaps they
could carry the burden of procedure reform and power adjustment;
but history surely proves that the job cannot be left to them. The
aid of legislatures must be sought, to improve the work of both
agencies as a group and individual agencies.
Professor Clark Byse recently gave some excellent advice to reformers in India, as follows:
[T]he lesson to be drawn from the American experience with administrative procedure acts . . . is this: there is no easy or royal road to intelli-

gent reform in this important and complicated area of modern government. Adoption of reform measures must be preceded by careful, patient,
detailed research. When investigation discloses weaknesses, measures

carefully tailored to meet the problem should be proposed. Affected
agencies and private interests should be given an opportunity to study
and comment on the proposal before it is finally adopted. This method of
patiently pursuing facts and preparing remedial measures in light of the

specific evil disclosed is costly, slow and unspectacular. Yet it is clear to
me that only through29such rational processes will meaningful and lasting

reforms be achieved.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Preface to DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw TREAaisE at iii-iv (1958).
Id. at v-x.
Id. at iv.
Byse, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 1 J. IhiAN LAW

89, 107 (1958).

INSTITUTE

1959]

DAVIS TREATISE

True, but is it unfair to suggest that too many scholars and government lawyers, both after and prior to 1946 (when the APA was
enacted), have themselves anticipated and endorsed Professor
Davis's willingness to accept the Supreme Court as Big Brother?
Have they not seemed more conscientious in their Court critiques
and their attacks on others' nonjudicial reform proposals than in
their own proposals for reform? Professor Byse correctly notes that
we need careful, patient, and detailed research, and that reform
measures must be "carefully tailored." But is there sufficient evidence that disinterested observers are profiting much from careful,
patient, and detailed research reports that are already extant? As
examples of studies that too soon have gathered too much dust I
cite part VI of the Hoover Commission's report,30 and the 2094-page
responses to questionnaires 31 published by the House Committee
on Government Operations in connection with its study of organiza32
tion, practice and procedure in federal administrative agencies.
Many writers have pleasurably noted Justice Brandeis' comment
that "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country. "33 Unfortunately, in administrative law
those state experiments seem to have had minimal impact More
unfortunately, we have failed within governments, particularly within the federal government, to exploit all we could learn from the
experiments of coureagous and imaginative agencies. The inertia of
other agencies, unless prodded specifically or generally by the legislature, is indeed remarkable. 4
MI.TmH JOB AHEAD
The publication of the Davis Treatiseis a notable event in Administrative Law history. For the sake of long-range goals, I wish we
could mark it by a few rules of thumb like these;
30. Co~Nm'x oN ORGANrIz&ON OF TEE ExECUmTvE BRAucM oF =im CovonNmr,
TAsK FoncE REPoRT oN LEGAL SmvIcEs AND PRoc.DurtE pt. VI (1955).
31. HOUSE Co_,af. o N Govi imr
OpEnATioNs, 8STa CoNc., Isr SEss., Sunvy
AND STUDY OF ADINmISTATIE OnGANIZATION, PnoCEDUnE, AND PRACTnCz iN Tim
FiMEDAL AGENCIS (Comm. Print 1957).
32. See Rosenblum, The Dawson Committee's "Survej and Study of Administrative Organization, Procedure, and Practice," 10 AD. L. BuLL. 17 (1958); cf. testimony of the Director of the Office of Administrative Procedure, in the Dawson
Committee's hearings on Feb. 25, 1958.

33. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932); cf. Riesenfeld,
Law-making and Legislative Precedent in American Legal History, 33 MwN. L. REV.
103 (1949).
34. To illustrate: Why, ten years after a general law on rule making has been
enacted, is it necessary for the legislature to remind agencies that, though emergency
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(1) Administrative law writers should have good reasons when they
fail to cite the Treatise.
Brief-writers gradually learn that it is wise to cite the authority,
and agency and judicial opinion-writers tend to acknowledge their
debts and differences of view. But I continue to be surprised when
I see so many legal writings where the author, impliedly, would have
readers believe that the issues he treats have not already been the
subject of reputable analysis. In the three most recent annual surveys of the Supreme Court by the Harvard Law Review, for example, all these topics were discussed without even a courtesy
reference to either the Davis text or the Davis periodical writings
that preceded his Treatise:
Administrative Procedure Act
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
Governmental functions and the Tort Claims Act
Retroactive revocation of tax exemption
Right to counsel in state administrative investigation
Suspension of deportation
Supervision of undeportable aliens
Bight to travel
Federal employee security program
[Determination of] insanity after conviction
Restrictions on presidential removal power
Similarly, the last two bound volumes of the Harvard Law Review
disclose these "non-Davised" notes and comments:
FTC has power to issue subpoenas
Dismissal of students: "due process"
Federal court lacks jurisdiction of antitrust action brought by
United States to revoke license granted by FCC
Court will review agency's refusal to act even though statute
makes agency act ineffective without presidential approval
[Primary] jurisdiction over [air-carrier] tariff provisions
Combination of judicial and nonjudicial functions in one body
violates Australian constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers
Ought we not query the publication of a remarkable series of five
Harvard articles on judicial review, with 727 footnotes, where the
Davis writings are referenced only nine times? And in a 112-page
survey of "Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials," 8
regulations without hearings are sometimes essential, hearings following the emergency, if the regulation is to be kept in force, are both desirable and practicable?
See Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1919; cf. Newman, Two Decades of Administrative Law in
California: A Critique, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 190 (1956). But see Kintner, Voluntary
,lmprovement of Administrative Processes in Lieu of Statutory Changes, 25 CC
PRAc. J. 1081 (1958).
35. Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 827 (1957).

1959]

DAVIS TREATISE

647

should the Davis articles on "Unreviewable Administrative Action, -36 "Tort Liability of Governmental Units,"3 and "Administrafive Officers' Tort Liability" 3 have been ignored?3" Nor is Harvard
by any means atypical. For instance see An Introduction to American Administrative Law,40 where the author does cite the 1951 text
but mentions not one of the fifteen or so excellent articles that Pro-

fessor Davis published during the period 1954-1957.
I do not suggest that the Treatise should always be cited-only
that there be good reason for not citing it For many years that was

the rule, usually honored, for the 1941 Attorney General's Commit-

tee report. 41 That report has become dated, but we now have a

Wigmore on Evidence for Administrative Law. Rightly, there will
be dispute regarding the Davis conclusions. But the fact that he, our
most comprehensive scholar, has or has not reached a conclusion is

itself surely worthy of note.2
(2) Administrative law reformers should have good reasons when
they fail to read or re-readthe Treatise.
For certain controversies the battlegrounds are so strewn with
arguments that contestants are easily excused from a duty to arm

themselves with old authority. "Administrative court" controversies
perhaps fit in that category.43
36. 15 F.R.D. 411 (1954).
37. 40 MnN. L. REv. 751 (1956).
38. 55 Mxcr. L. REv. 201 (1956).
39. In 841 footnotes, Davis's Mandatory Relief From Administratlvo Action it.
the Federal Courts, 22 U. CHL L. REv. 585 (1955), is cited twice, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other Than Damages, 40 ConsIuLL L. Q.
3 (1954), once, and Government Officers as Defendants: Two Troublesome Problems,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1955), four times. The 1951 text, DAvis, AD misTnRATrI LAW
(1951) is noted only twice.
40. ScvwAnTz, AN INTRODUCTON TO AmERIC.N ADnmsa'rTwrwE LmW (1958).
41. Arr'y GEN. Comm., REPORT ON Am5m.m-ATrVE PnoCEMURE n CoVE.MMN-r
AGENCIES (1941).

42. Please do not infer that the Davis record of citing other authors is exemplary.
In the Treatise I can find no reference to the American Administrative Law texts by
Carrow, Cooper, Forkosch, Lavery, Parker, Schwartz, Swenson or yom Baur. Among
the casebooks, though several are cited, e.g., Franlfurter &Davidson's second, Freund's
first, Gellhor's first, Merrill, Stason's first, second and third; more are not, e.g.,
Davison & Grundstein, Gellhom & Byse, Hart's first and second, Jaffe, Katz, Sears,
McFarland & Vanderbilt's first and second. Cf. EiEmsoN & HIEr, PoirncA A.ND
Crvm PiRC-Rs n Tnm UxrrD STATES (2d ed. 1958); HA T & WVEcHsLm, Tim FED___
CouRTs AND TiE FEDraAL SYsmTi (1953); RIESmELD & MAXWELL, MODERN
SOCIAL LEGIsLATIoN (1950); NEwMAN & StmnY, LECsLsAT x (1955); and other
related casebooks.
I do not know why the Treatise contains no section comparable to § 9 of the
text (entitled "Materials, Literature, and Casefinders"). The reader is not even

advised as to the regular publication of P=K & Fsmm,AD MImNsTRATIvE LAw 2d.
Absolutely inexcusable is the failure to comment on GELLHoan, Changing Attitudes
Toward the Administrative Process, in INnrvmuAL FEEDOM AND GovEmmmrAL
BEsnu s ch. 1 (1956). I also miss references to specialized texts such as HANDLE ,
ANTRusT I PERPECTV (1957) and Loss, SEuarrmEs REc U .Lxons
(1951).
43. 1 DAvis § 1.04, at 28 n.12, 31 n.28.
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There are other controversies, though, where enlightenment might
result if the reformers were automatically to check the basic texts.
In recent years I have had the chance to watch the development of
section 1005(c) of Senate Bill 1070,"4 now before the Congress,
which deals with separation-of-functions law under the proposed
Code of Federal Administrative Procedure. The progression to that
section from section 5(c) of the APA4" through section 204(c) of
the Hoover Task Force statute 46 and Recommendation No. 87 of
the Hoover Commission 47 is easy to trace. I do wonder, however,
how many of the cognizant revisers ever troubled to look at chapter
10 of the 1951 text. And in February 1959, when the Section of
Administrative Law of the American Bar Association decided to
include separation-of-functions law in its proposal dealing with
influence peddling, I am sure that the cognizant committeemen and
council members had recently read neither that chapter nor chapter
11 of the Treatise.48

We need not endorse the varied reform proposals that Professor
Davis has set forth; nor should we consider reverently the objections
he makes to proposals of others. Rather, would we not usually profit
from an automatic check with the leading author -for background,
existing law, and references, as well as ideas?
(3) Administrative law researchersshould have good reasons when
they choose to re-examine a topic well-treated in the Treatise, instead of giving us guidance on a new topic or a topic not treated
adequately.
Is it too much to ask, generally, that we shun further analysis of
the Ben Avon 49 doctrine, Crowell v. Benson," and Gray v. Powell? 5' Or that with respect to alien and passport cases, for example,
we focus more on reform than on news bulletins regarding the latest
appellate pronouncements?
Professor Davis has provided us with jumping off points. He has
exposed serious gaps in our learning. Most of us who are interested
in administrative law per se (distinguished from labor law, tax
law, public utilities law, water law, etc.) will, I suppose, continue
44. S. 1070, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1005(c) (1959).
45. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
46. CoNa'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIV BRANCH OF VIE
TAsK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PnocEDUmE 409 (1955).

COVERNMENT,

47. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BnANcix OF TiE COVERNIENT,
REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-63 (1955).
48 In fact, one might ask how recently they had even re-read § 1005(c) of S.
1070, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959). See the Spring 1959 and Fall 1958 issues of the

Sections Administrative Law Bulletin; cf. Newman, The Supreme Court, Congressional Investigations, and Influence Peddling, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 796, 807 (1958).
49. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
50. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
51. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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our refusal to focus on the woes of particular agencies. We want to
remain generalists; and we lack spare hours that are needed to acquire the extra substantive knowledge which must precede reforms
in procedures set by the FCC statutes,52 the CAB rules, or loyaltysecurity and cemetery board practices.

As generalists, though, we hardly lack problems. To fill gaps,
researchers are needed to help guide us through the newer writings
of the behavioral scientists.5 3 Other researchers must give us better
bibliographies 54 and must check back into related fields, examining
again parallel law that too quickly we assumed was either wise or
distinguishable. The Treatise begins such work notably as to evidence5 5 and official notice. 6 And it identifies questions arisingfrom
assumptions that the traditions of grand juries and parole ofcials,
say, should govern agency proceedings that appear similar. " Further, some researchers should aim to improve the miserable total
product of comparative study in administrative law. We are not
yet ready for painstaking comparisons of all United States processes
with those of all other nations; but surely we could import some
theories, principles,
and gimmicks that would be valuable to our
5
governments.

8

52. I mention cemetery boards because of a Jan. 2, 1959 ruling that the California
State Cemetery Board need not pass upon or even consider protests made by neighboring landowners against granting a license to operate a cemetery. 82 Ops. CA.ur.
AT-r'Cy G . 297 (1959). The ruling seems outrageous; and yet to draft reforms a
critic would have to study not only cemetery problems but also county board-ofsupervisors procedures for zoning variances, because the protestants in these cases
are preliminarily heard by the county board. Cf. Pfeiffer, Shortening the Record in
CAB ProceedingsThrough Elimination of Unnecessary and Hazardous Cross-Examination, 22 J. Am L. & Coar. 286 (1955); Schih, New Techniques for Expediting
Hearingsin FCC Proceedings, 55 COLmi. L. Rv. 830 (1955); Note, Summary Di,
posal of Proteststo FCC, 25 Fosu.D . L. REv. 777 (1957); Newman, Book Review,
46 CALIF. L. IEv. 654 (1958) [reviewing BRowN, LoyAxxrY A D SEcunrr" (1958)].
53. "rhe areas of study in political science differ significantly in the extent to
which they have thus far been subjected to the behavioralist approach. The least
... studied are perhaps public law, jurisprudence, and judicial affairs ....
WALDo,
Po-ncsu. ScrEcE iN THE U.S.A. 23 (1956); cf. WNASsmiNLt & Smuxoma, DcsmoxMAKnGq: AN ANNoTATED BIrewoGRAPuy (1958); Lazar, The Human Sciences and
Legal Institutional Development; Role and Reference Group Concepts Related to the
Development of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 31 Nom DAM-, LA..
414 (1956); Roche, Political Science and Science Fiction, 52 Am. PoL. Scx. REv.
1026 (1958).
54. Cf. Conn, Bibliography: Administrative Law and Procedure, 44 CALIF. L.
Rxv. 378 (1956) (California). The Administrative Law Section of the American
Bar Association is now preparing a practitioners manual that is designed to lead
its readers to the significant literature regarding all federal agencies.
55. 2 DAViS §§ 14.01-.04.
56. Id. §§ 15.01-.14.
57. 1 id. §§ 7.16, 8.10.
58. Our most ambitious export project, to date, involves India. See the first issue
of the Journal of the IndianLaw Institute (1958). Cf. Putauc LAw PRonLms n INDIA
(Ebb ed. 1957). Imports are almost nonexistent, though we do aclmowledge that
the British too seem to have discovered Administrative Law. See, e.g., 1 DAvis §§
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Most important of all, we need further analyses where Professor
Davis has shown us that our work to date is mostly exploratory. To
illustrate: Has he not proved that "More harmful than helpful is the
proposition . . . that hearings are required for judicial functions
but not for legislative functions . .. "9 If that be true, do we not

desparately need some learned scrutiny of our mystique regarding
"hearing on the record"? And for non-record hearings, how can we
longer postpone a full-scale attack on the frequent discrepancies of
concern that are starkly exposed by contrasts between section 5 of
the APA60 ("adjudication required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity for agency hearing"), and the sad little
third sentence of section 6(a) (all other adjudication)?
In sum, the four volumes that Kenneth Culp Davis has presented
to us could be foundation stones for crucial expansion. We witnessed
such an expansion after 1941, when practitioners, scholars, and reformers, similarly indebted to one man (Walter Gellhorn), were
able to build significantly from a base supplied by his first casebook,"' by the report of the Attorney General's Committee,12 and by
that Committee's excellent series of agency monographs. 3 If, eighteen years from now, a new expansion were reflected in writings that
contribute then as much as Professor Davis's Treatise contributes
now, to him we should be doubly indebted.
1.04, 6.08; cf. 9 AD. LAw. BULL. 144 (1957) (London Meeting). See generally
Szladits, Current Literature on Foreign and Comparative Law, 6 Am. J. COMP. L.
629, 665 (1957); Book Review, 3 AD. Smi. Q. 121 (1958). Why still unexamined
are such elementary questions as how Britain seems to survive without either records
or briefs? My bias regarding the aims of "scholarly" importing is disclosed in Nowman, Money and Elections Law in Britain-Guidefor America?, 10 W. POL. Q. 582
(1957).
59. 1 DAvis § 7.03, at 415.
60. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
61. GELLHORN, ADmnsTRArVE LAw, CASES AND COMMENTS (1940).
62. ATr'Y GEN. COMM., REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRocmuRE IN GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES (1941).
63. AITr'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, MONOGnAPu Nos.

(1940).
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